This monograph explores the nature of De Re Thoughts, and its impact on the debates centering on the externalist versus internalist accounts of the mind as discussed in analytic philosophy. Taking into account the fact that questions of language and questions of mind are intrinsically related to one another, the monograph, in the first place, tries to develop a notion of de re thoughts from the different accounts of reference. Through a close study of the writings of Russell, Frege, Evans, Burge, Putnam, McDowell, Recanati etc. on the notion of singular reference, a case is made for accepting de re thoughts as thoughts tied constitutively with their objects and as essentially individuated in terms of their objects. The picture of mind that evolves in and through this study of de re thoughts is that the mind is essentially intentional, embodied, interactive, and world-involving. So, an attempt is made to displace the internalist understanding of the mind in favor of an externalist notion of it - where the mind can be seen in continuation with the world and as having no context-free essence.
This monograph explores the nature of De Re Thoughts, and its impact on the debates centering on the externalist versus internalist accounts of the mind as discussed in analytic philosophy. Taking into account the fact that questions of language and questions of mind are intrinsically related to one another, the monograph, in the first place, tries to develop a notion of de re thoughts from the different accounts of reference. Through a close study of the writings of Russell, Frege, Evans, Burge, Putnam, McDowell, Recanati etc. on the notion of singular reference, a case is made for accepting de re thoughts as thoughts tied constitutively with their objects and as essentially individuated in terms of their objects. The picture of mind that evolves in and through this study of de re thoughts is that the mind is essentially intentional, embodied, interactive, and world-involving. So, an attempt is made to displace the internalist understanding of the mind in favor of an externalist notion of it - where the mind can be seen in continuation with the world and as having no context-free essence.